bias, he thus leaves readers mystified about the substance of Cattell's thoughts, either early or late in his career. Let me offer three brief comparisons of the former with the latter.
In the 1930s, Cattell argued for the "replacement of indubitably backward people by a more evolved stock," a process in which, "by gradual restriction of births, and by life in adapted reserves and asylums, . . . the races which have served their turn [must] be brought to euthanasia" (Tucker, 2009, p. 94) . In 1972, he again called for the extinction of "failing" races, lest the earth "be choked with . . . more primitive forerunners" and coined the neologism "genthanasia" for the necessary process of "phasing out . . . a moribund culture . . . by educational and birth control measures" (Tucker, 2009, pp. 118-119) .
As one of the backward groups slated for elimination, in the 1930s Cattell named "the Negro," who "has established a stable culture . . . but has contributed practically nothing to social progress and culture" (Tucker, 2009, p. 94) . In 1972, he offered the hypothetical example of a society in which a capable race was threatened by the "parasitism" of a lessintelligent race with genes for resistance to malaria (Tucker, 2009, p. 112) . The identity of the parasitic group is hardly a mystery to anyone familiar with elementary genetics.
In the 1930s, Cattell wrote that "repeopling, by more intelligent and alert peoples, of parts of the earth possessed by backward people is merely following the highest moral considerations" (Tucker, 2009, p. 89) . In 1972, he called for "failing groups . . . to go the wall, or be radically re-constituted, possibly by outside intervention," whereas "successful groups . . . should increase their power, influence and size of population" (Tucker, 2009, p. 118) . I leave it to readers to judge whether Dumont's charge of "bias" is warranted or whether Cattell's later writing is "less politically and ethically repugnant" (Conclusion section, para. 1).
Dumont also claims that I made "ad personam attacks" (Cattell Convention section, para 5) on individuals. I certainly described instances in which Cattell's defenders published gross distortions of events or outright fiction, but these are criticisms of their academic behavior, not their personal characteristics. In any event, Dumont offers neither example nor evidence of an ad personam attack on my part, so it is difficult to know what he has in mind.
Dumont terms it a "judgment call whether one's science is separable from one's related ideological convictions" (Crux of the Controversy section, para. 2) and summarizes my argument as insisting that Cattell's "racism . . . must have seeped into his trait psychology" (Conclusion section, para. 1). The connection between Cattell's racial ideology (nowhere do I refer to his "racism") is neither a judgment call nor an inference on my part. It is Cattell, not I, who insisted throughout his career that a major purpose of his work on trait measurement-indeed, the reason that he relinquished a promising career in the physical sciences to pursue the relatively new field of psychology-was to be able to assess the value of both individuals and races so that the appropriate eugenic actions could be taken.
Moreover, Dumont calls Elie Wiesel's comparison of Cattell's ideas with Nazi theories a "calumny," one that justified an "unscheduled intervention" (Cattell Convention section, para. 4) at the end of Wiesel's keynote address to correct the error. Yet again he
